No. 12-01-00485-CV

Bobie Kenneth Townsend,			§	In The District Court Of
Plaintiff;		§
						§	
VS.						§	Montgomery County, Texas
						§	
Montgomery Central Appraisal		§	
District, Et. Al.				§	359th Judicial District
Defendants. 		§

Plaintiff’s Memorandum Of Law 
In Support Of Plaintiff’s Original Petition

Comes Now, plaintiff, Bobie Kenneth Townsend, in propria persona, herein further known as plaintiff, without the benefit of counsel, submits this memorandum of law to support plaintiff’s original petition.

1.	The foregoing will address different means to prove the subject matter by bolding, underlining and other aspects of emphases in stating the relevant terminology and by no means is used to change the original intent of the Texas legislature.
2.	Plaintiff submits this memorandum as an offer of proof in the preponderance of evidence shown below that plaintiff’s property in question is non-income producing private property and is not subject to taxation and has not been rendered for taxation as per the Texas Tax Code and as by the intent of the Texas legislature.

PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT OF PROPERTY
3.	In June of 2004, the previous owners of plaintiff’s property granted plaintiff’s spouse and plaintiff the property in question by Warranty Deed filed in the Montgomery County Clerk’s Office. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit ZB)
4.	Plaintiff’s spouse and plaintiff accepted the grantors Warranty Deed by filing in the Montgomery County Clerk’s Office a Warranty Deed Certificate of Acknowledgement. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit ZC)
5.	As to quash any presumption that plaintiff had acquiesced consent for others to represent plaintiff’s affairs, plaintiff filed in the Montgomery County Clerk’s Office a Release of Powers of Appointment. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit ZD)
6.	Plaintiff states that neither plaintiff’s spouse nor plaintiff is a firm that could be construed to own plaintiff’s property.
7.	Plaintiff states that neither plaintiff’s spouse nor plaintiff is a corporation that could be construed to own plaintiff’s property. 
8.	Plaintiff states that neither plaintiff’s spouse nor plaintiff is a company that could be construed to own plaintiff’s property.
9.	Plaintiff states that neither plaintiff’s spouse nor plaintiff uses plaintiff’s property in a governmental activity.

RIGHTS RETAINED FOR ONE HUNDRED YEARS
10.	Article 8, Section 18(a) of the current Texas Constitution specifies that plaintiff’s property must be “subject to or rendered for taxation” to be added to the appraisal roll. 
11.	Even certain sections of the Texas Constitution verify that consent is needed by the property owner of private property.  An example is found in Article 11, Section 12 where it states in part: “…with the consent of the owner of the private property,…”. Within Section 12 there is an admission that there are other types of property by stating the term “private property” instead of just ‘property’ or ‘taxable property’.
12.	In 1875 the United States Congress created the Resumption of Specie Act of 1875 bringing back the gold standard for U.S. Currency after the American Civil War.
13.	In 1876 a new organic Texas Constitution was created by the Texas people.
14.	In the organic 1876 Texas Constitution Article 14, Section 6 the creators of the 1876 Texas Constitution found it necessary to declare that the people of Texas had the right to claim public land for themselves and then only be subject to a filing fee to register the land in their name.
Article 14, Sec. 6.  (Repealed Aug. 5, 1969.) SEC. 6. To every head of a family without a homestead, there shall be donated one hundred and sixty acres of public land, upon condition that he will select and locate said land, and occupy the same three years and pay the office fees due thereon. To all single men of eighteen years of age and upwards, shall be donated eighty acres of public land, upon the terms and conditions prescribed for heads of families.

15.	Plaintiff claims his right to public land that was provided in Article 14, Section 6 of the organic 1876 Texas Constitution.
16.	In 1969, the Texas legislature violated Article 1, Section 29 of the organic 1876 Texas Constitution by submitting the removal of Article 14, Section 6 of the organic 1876 Texas Constitution to a vote of the Texas people to agree to have their rights removed from their view, but still such rights remained and are still retained by the Texas people.
Texas Constitution Article 1, Sec. 29.  PROVISIONS OF BILL OF RIGHTS EXCEPTED FROM POWERS OF GOVERNMENT; TO FOREVER REMAIN INVIOLATE.  To guard against transgressions of the high powers herein delegated, we declare that everything in this "Bill of Rights" is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolate, and all laws contrary thereto, or to the following provisions, shall be void.

17.	Judicial notice will be taken of Article 1, Section 29 of the Texas Constitution.
18.	Under Article 3, Section 30 of the organic 1876 Texas Constitution it states in part: “No law shall be passed, except by bill, …”
19.	The Texas Legislature cannot delegate any law creating any authority for municipalities that could affect the vested rights of people in Texas that has not received a benefit from the municipality or the State of Texas and Article 1, Section 29 of the Texas Constitution forbids any law being passed that would effect the vested rights of the people of Texas.
20.	In the organic 1876 Texas Constitution Article 16, Section 18 the creators of the 1876 Texas Constitution found it necessary to declare that an individual of the Texas people had rights of property and those rights could not be taken away by any Act of the Texas legislature.
Article 16, Sec. 18.  (Repealed Nov. 2, 1999.)  SEC. 18. The rights of property and of action, which have been acquired under the constitution and laws of the Republic and State, shall not be divested; nor shall any rights or actions which have been divested, barred, or declared null and void by the Constitution of the Republic and State, be reinvested, renewed, or reinstated by this Constitution; but the same shall remain precisely in the situation which they were before the adoption of this Constitution, unless otherwise herein provided; and provided further, that no cause of action heretofore barred shall be revived.

21.	In 1999, the Texas legislature violated Article 1, Section 29 of the organic 1876 Texas Constitution by submitting the removal of Article 16, Section 18 of the organic 1876 Texas Constitution to a vote of the Texas people to agree to have such rights removed from their view, but still such rights remained and are still retained by the Texas people, as seen below.
22.	When an individual of the Texas people go back and review the repealed sections of the 2000 Texas Constitution, like Article 16, Section 18 stated above, an individual of the Texas people will find a curious “TEMPORARY TRANSITION PROVISIONS” found just under the Article 16, Sec. 18 that merely states: “Repealed”.
(TEMPORARY TRANSITION PROVISIONS for Sec. 18: See Appendix, Note 1.)

23.	When an individual of the Texas people review the Appendix of the 2000 Texas Constitution for “Note 1”, an individual of the Texas people will be reminded, for a short period of time of their rights retained, even though the rights are removed from public view.
1.  H.J.R. No. 62, Section 56, 76th Legislature, Regular Session, 1999.
(n)  The amendment of any provision does not affect vested rights.

24.	Plaintiff claims his rights of property that was provided in Article 16, Section 18 of the organic 1876 Texas Constitution.
25.	In 1876 the newly established Texas legislature created the General Laws Of Texas, Chapter 157 “An Act defining what money and property is subject to taxation or exemption, and the mode of listing the same.”(See Plaintiff’s Exhibit H)
26.	In the 1876 General Laws Of Texas, Chapter 157 shows the intent of the Texas legislature of whom would be assessed and have taxes collected there from.

Texas Legislative Act of August 21, 1876
“The term person, whenever used in this act or any other act regulating the assessment and collection of taxes, shall be construed to include firm, company or corporation.”

Include: To confine within, hold as in an enclosure, take in, attain, shut up, contain, enclose, comprise, comprehend, embrace, involve.
Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition

inclusio unius est exclusio alterius
The inclusion of one is the exclusion of another. The certain designation of one person is an absolute exclusion of all others. This doctrine decrees that where law expressly describes particular situation to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or excluded was intended to be omitted or excluded.

27.	The Texas legislature codified the Acts of the legislature in the Revised Civil Statutes.
28.	In the 1913 McEachin's Texas Civil Statutes Annotated on page 2735 is found the same definition of “person” in Texas statutes when regulating assessment or collection of taxes.
29.	In the 1914 Vernon's Sayle's Texas Civil Statutes on page 4673 is found the same definition of “person” in Texas statutes when regulating assessment or collection of taxes.
30.	In the 1925 Vernon's Sayle's Texas Civil Statutes on page 2069 is found the same definition of “person” in Texas statutes when regulating assessment or collection of taxes but they added G. L. Vol. 8, p. 1111.
31.	In 1936 the edition of the REVISED CIVIL STATUTES is found the same definition of “person” in Texas statutes when regulating assessment or collection of taxes, but now being Art. 7149 and showing that was found previously at [7506] and [5064].
32.	Further research shows no changes to the definition of “person” found in the 1943 & 1945 versions of the VERNON' S TEXAS STATUTES Supplement.
33.	In 1948 the edition of the REVISED CIVIL STATUTES is found the same definition of “person” as in 1876.
34.	In the VERNON' S TEXAS STATUTES Supplement found in 1952, 1956, 1960, 1962, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970 & 1972 the definition of “person” stayed the same.
35.	In the 1974 version of West's Texas Statutes & Codes, Compact Edition, [page 934 Column 2] an individual of the Texas people will not find a change in the definition of “person”.
36.	In 1979 the Texas legislature decided to repeal article 7149 in the REVISED CIVIL STATUTES perhaps so as to remove it from the public’s eye.
Art. 7147 to 7149.
Repeal
This article is repealed by Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 2329, ch. 841, sec. 6(a)(1), effective January 1, 1982, sec. 1 of which enacts the Property Tax Code, constituting Title 1 of the Tax Code.

37.	From 1876 until 1979 the same definition of “person” and such reference of the source of the definition (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit H) was found in the Texas Revised Civil Statutes.
“The term “Person” shall be construed to include firm, company or corporation.”
(Source)[Acts 1876, 275; G.L. Vol. 8, p. 1111]

38.	In 1979 Section 1.04 of the newly established Texas Tax Code was decided as the location for the definitions found in the Texas Revised Civil Statutes concerning the assessment and collection of taxes.
39.	In 1979, by omission, the sitting Texas legislature found it unnecessary to provide the definition of the term “Person” that was found in the Texas Revised Civil Statutes for one hundred years.
40.	The Texas Courts are required to recognize the intent of the Texas legislature that the definition of “person” established for one hundred years as being well settled concerning the assessment and collection of taxes.
41.	The organic 1876 Texas Constitution Article 1, Section 29, forbids the Texas legislature from gaining any interest in non-income producing private property without the consent of the property owner that is not a firm, corporation or company.
42.	When the Texas legislature repealed the Texas Revised Civil Statutes Article 7149 and thereby enacting the Property Tax Code, that code was immediately governed by the Code Construction Act, which keeps the legislative intent of the definition of “person” to be a firm, company or corporation.
The Code Construction Act, Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 101.002. CONSTRUCTION OF CODE.  (a) The Code Construction Act (Chapter 311, Government Code) applies to the construction of each provision of this title, except as specifically provided by this title.
(b)  Except as otherwise provided by statute, the jurisdiction and authority of the state to determine the subjects and objects of taxation shall extend to the limits of the then-current interpretations of the Texas Constitution and United States Constitution and laws.

The Code Construction Act, Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.001et seq., provides that when the legislature enacts a statute, it is presumed that compliance with the Texas Constitution and the United States Constitution is intended; the entire statute is intended to be effective; a just and reasonable result is intended; a result feasible of execution is intended; and public interest is favored over any private interest. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(1998)."  Lee v. Mitchell, 23 S.W.3d 209, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 4538 (Tex. App., July 10, 2000, Opinion Filed ).

43.	Even though the definition of “Person”, found in the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, was omitted from being found in the Texas Tax Code, the courts must adhere to the intent of the Texas legislature where a definition is not found in the Tax Code.
“A fundamental rule controlling the construction of a statute is to determine, if possible, the intent of the legislature as expressed in the language of that statute. However, legislative intent is the law itself, and must be enforced if determined although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. State v. Dyer, 145 Tex. 586, 200 S.W.2d 813 (1947). ” CARL E. CRIMMINS v. JAMES M. LOWRY 691 S.W.2d 582  (05/29/85)

Texas Government Code Sec. 312.005. Legislative Intent
In interpreting a statute, a court shall diligently attempt to ascertain legislative intent and shall consider at all times the old law, the evil, and the remedy.

Sec. 311.023.  STATUTE CONSTRUCTION AIDS.  In construing a statute, whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous on its face, a court may consider among other matters the:
(1)  object sought to be attained;
(2)  circumstances under which the statute was enacted;
(3)  legislative history;
(4)  common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects;
(5)  consequences of a particular construction;
(6)  administrative construction of the statute;  and
(7)  title (caption), preamble, and emergency provision.

44.	Judicial notice will be taken of Sections 312.005 and 311.023 of the Texas Government Code.
45.	Non-income producing property is not subject to taxation unless rendered for taxation.
46.	The Texas Tax Code Section 22.01(a) echo’s the provision of Article 8, Section 1-d where it indicates specific type of property that is “used for the production of income” “shall be rendered for taxation”.
Texas Tax Code
Sec. 22.01.  RENDITION GENERALLY.
(a)  Except as provided by Chapter 24, a person shall render for taxation all tangible personal property used for the production of income that the person owns or that the person manages and controls as a fiduciary on January 1….
(b)  When required by the chief appraiser, a person shall render for taxation any other taxable property that he owns or that he manages and controls as a fiduciary on January 1.
(c)  A person may render for taxation any property that he owns or that he manages and controls as a fiduciary on January 1, although he is not required to render it by Subsection (a) or (b) of this section.

47.	Before 1979, the elected Tax Assessor/Collector was the party that accepted rendering forms by those that desired to render their property for taxation as to be allowed to vote where and how the property tax fund would be spent in the community.
The situation as stated in these two findings is similar to the facts in Hanson v. Jordan, 145 Tex. 320, 198 S.W.2d 262. Justice Brewster, speaking for the Supreme Court, after stating that the purpose of Art. VI, Sec. 3a, Constitution of the State of Texas, limiting voters at a bond election to voters who had duly rendered their property for taxes, was to induce owners of property to place it upon the tax rolls and become liable for its pro rata share of the taxes levied and assessed by the municipality,… CITY OF ROMA v. GONZALEZ, 397 S.W.2d 943(1965)

REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT
48.	Judicial notice will be taken of Article 1, Section 2 of the Texas Constitution.
Texas Constitution, Article 1, Section 2
“All political power is inherent in the people and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit. The faith of the people of Texas stands pledged to the preservation of a republican form of government, and, subject to this limitation only, they have at all times the inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such manner as they may think expedient.”

49.	Being guaranteed, under Article 1, Section 2 of the organic 1876 Texas Constitution, a republican form of government guarantees the Texas people the ability to control their public servants’ conduct through the ballot box.
Republican government. One in which the powers of sovereignty are vested in the people and are exercised by the people, either directly, or through representatives chosen by the people, to whom those powers are specially delegated. [In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 11 S.Ct. 573, 35 L.Ed. 219; Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 22 L.Ed. 627." Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 626.]

It may be concluded, therefore, that a fundamental principle associated with our republican form of government is that every public officeholder remains in his position at the sufferance and for the benefit of the public, subject to removal from office by edict of the ballot box at the time of the next election, or before that time by any other constitutionally permissible means.
Tarrant County v. Ashmore, 635 SW 2d 417 - Tex: Supreme Court, 1982

50.	No election in any district has elected by ballot any member or any employee of any central appraisal district in Texas, for the position they hold.
51.	No central appraisal district in Texas could claim any authority over any non-income producing private property of an individual of the Texas people.
52.	The central appraisal districts are not a republican form of government as guaranteed by Article 1, Section 2 of the organic 1876 Texas Constitution.
53.	Now, the non-elected, without an Oath of Office, chief appraisers of the central appraisal districts in Texas is the party for those that desire to render their private property for taxation.
54.	The chief appraisers, without authority, have declared all property within a county was subject to taxation and placed all private property on the appraisal roll each year without the consent of the property owners, unless the Chief Appraisers were ordered to have certain property removed from the appraisal roll by a District Court.
Texas Tax Code
Sec. 22.22.  METHOD FOR REQUIRING RENDITION OR REPORT.  The chief appraiser may require a rendition statement or property report he is authorized to require by this chapter by delivering written notice that the statement or report is required to the person responsible for filing it.  He shall attach to the notice a copy of the appropriate form.

55.	Please take note of the term “person” above and the intent of the 1876 Texas legislature meaning of the term “person” concerning the assessment and collections of taxes for one hundred years.
56.	In 1967 the Texas legislature found it necessary to create the Multistate Tax Compact which was passed in June 13, 1967 concerning multistate taxpayers. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit I)
57.	In this Multistate Tax Compact an individual of the Texas people will find the meaning of the term “Taxpayer”.
ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS
As used in this compact:
3. ‘Taxpayer’ means any corporation, partnership, firm, association, governmental unit or agency or person acting as a business entity in more than one state.

58.	In 1979 when the Texas Legislature repealed the Revised Civil Statutes, they also codified the Multistate Tax Compact in the Texas Tax Code where it can be found today under Chapter 141 of the Tax Code.
59.	In the current Tax Code under Chapter 141, Section 141.001, Article II. DEFINITIONS we find the exact same definition of “Taxpayer” as was created on June 13th, 1967, as shown above.
60.	Please take note of the term “person” above and the intent of the 1876 Texas legislature’s meaning of the term “person” concerning the assessment and collections of taxes for one hundred years.

LOCATED IN THIS STATE
61.	In plaintiff’s last ARB hearing the Chief Appraiser alleged to the Appraisal Review Board that Section 11.01 of the Texas Tax Code subject plaintiff’s private property for taxation do to the fact that plaintiff’s property was in Montgomery County.
62.	Section 11.01 of the Texas Tax Code uses the term “…located in this state,…” and “…in this state…”.
SUBCHAPTER A. 
TAXABLE PROPERTY,
§11.01. Real and Tangible Personal Property
(a) All real and tangible personal property that this state has jurisdiction to tax is taxable unless exempt by law.
(b) This state has jurisdiction to tax real property if located in this state.
(c) This state has jurisdiction to tax tangible personal property if the property is:
          (1) located in this state for longer than a temporary period; 
          (2) temporarily located outside this state and the owner resides in this state;  or
          (3) used continually, whether regularly or irregularly, in this state.

63.	In City of Houston v Morgan Guarantee, 666 S.W.2d 524 (Tex.App. 1st Dist. 1983), the 1st Court of Appeals determined that the term “…located in this state,…” found in the Texas Tax Code “…means both doing business and being domicile in Texas”. 
64.	Plaintiff claims that plaintiff’s non-income producing private property is not “located in this state” as determined by the 1st District Court of Appeals as plaintiff is not doing business out of plaintiff’s property.
65.	Section 151.004 of the Texas Tax Code defines the term “In this state”.
Sec. 151.004. "In This State"
"In this state" means within the exterior limits of Texas and includes all territory within these limits ceded to or owned by the United States.
Acts 1981, 67th Leg., p. 1545, ch. 389, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1982.

66.	Plaintiff claims that plaintiff’s non-income producing private property is not “in this state” as defined by Sec. 151.004 of the Texas Tax Code as plaintiff’s property has not been ceded to or is owned by the United States.
67.	The appraisal review board was created by the Texas legislature in 1979 to take the place of the constitutional Board of Equalization in each county.
68.	These appraisal review boards have apparently been instructed that all property in the county is subject to taxation unless the non-elected, without an Oath of Office, Chief Appraiser say different, no matter what evidence is presented before them. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit B)
69.	Little do the members of the appraisal review boards know that the Texas legislature recently found it necessary to subject the members of the ARB for multiple years in jail and thousands of dollars in fines for talking about a case before the hearing, when only last year the penalty was just a small fine.
Tax Code (effective Sept. 2011)
§ 6.411.  Ex Parte Communications; Penalty 
   (a) A member of an appraisal review board commits an offense if the member communicates with the chief appraiser or another employee or a member of the board of directors of the appraisal district for which the appraisal review board is established in violation of Section 41.66(f).
(d) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

70.	Being a government employee has its pit falls.
71.	Even though Texas Tax Code Section 41.45(c) requires the chief appraiser to be present at each and every hearing, there is no penalty in the Tax Code for the chief appraiser failing to do his duty.

Texas Tax Code
Sec.A41.45.AAHEARING ON PROTEST.
(c)AAThe chief appraiser shall appear at each protest hearing before the appraisal review board to represent the appraisal office.

“However, governmental immunity does not preclude prospective injunctive remedies in official capacity suits against government employees who violate statutory or constitutional provisions.” 
City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366,368-69 (Tex. 2009)

72.	The current Chief Appraiser failed to be present at plaintiff’s six out of seven previous appraisal review board hearings.
73.	The only reason the Chief Appraiser was present at plaintiff’s last appraisal review board hearings was the threat of subpoena.

VESTED RIGHTS
74.	Even if plaintiff had not been so fortunate to find the above intent of the Texas legislature in 1876, plaintiff has always had the vested right to own property that was not subject of being destroyed by the government, by having the property taxed out of plaintiff’s possession.
American Jurisprudence, Second Edition
Constitutional Law
ß   701. Generally; definition
The term "vested right" is not easily defined and has been used by the courts to express various shades of meaning. Generally speaking, "vested rights" is a term that is used to describe rights that cannot be taken away by retroactive legislation. For purposes of determining whether a law takes away or impairs a vested right acquired under existing law so as to render its application unlawfully retroactive, a "vested right" is one that is fixed, settled, absolute, and not contingent upon anything. The term is used to describe rights that cannot be taken away by retroactive legislation, since retroactive legislation affecting vested rights would constitute a taking of property without due process.

75.	The Texas legislature agrees that even repealing an amendment to the Texas Constitution cannot affect plaintiff’s vested right of property.
H.J.R. No. 75, Section 9.01, 77th Legislature, Regular Session, 2001.
TEMPORARY TRANSITION PROVISION. (a) This section applies to the amendments to this constitution proposed by H.J.R. No. 75, 77th Legislature, Regular Session, 2001. (b) The reenactment of any provision of this constitution for purposes of amendment does not revive a provision that may have been impliedly repealed by the adoption of a later amendment. (c) The amendment of any provision of this constitution does not affect vested rights.

76.	The Texas legislature agrees that even repealing a Texas statute cannot affect plaintiff’s vested right of property.
Texas Government Code
Sec. 311.031.  SAVING PROVISIONS.  (a)  Except as provided by Subsection (b), the reenactment, revision, amendment, or repeal of a statute does not affect:
(1)  the prior operation of the statute or any prior action taken under it;
(2)  any validation, cure, right, privilege, obligation, or liability previously acquired, accrued, accorded, or incurred under it;…

77.	A vested right of private property by an individual of the Texas people cannot be taxed other than by the people’s consent.
“Inalienable, means incapable of being surrendered or transferred, at least without one’s consent.”  Morrison v. State, 252 SW 2d 97, 101 (Mo. App.)

“Life, liberty, property, and the equal protection of the law, grouped together within the Constitutional law status, are so related that the deprivation of any one of those separate and independent rights may extinguish or lessen the value of the other three.”  Smith v. Texas, 233 US 630, 636, 58 L.Ed. 1129 (1913)

“If it could be said that the state had the power to tax a right, this would enable the state to destroy rights guaranteed by the constitutions through the use of oppressive taxation. …The power to tax involves the power to destroy.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316

“The individual, unlike the corporation, cannot be taxed for the mere privilege of existing. The corporation is an artificial entity which owes its existence and charter powers to the state: but the individual’s right to live, and own property are natural rights for the enjoyment of which an excise {tax} cannot be imposed.” Redfield v. Fisher, 292 P 813, pg 819 (1930)

“A right common in every citizen such as the right to own property or to engage in business of a character not requiring regulation CANNOT, however, be taxed as a special franchise by first prohibiting its exercise and then permitting its enjoyment upon the payment of a certain sum of money.” Spring Valley Water Works v. Barber, 33 P 735

“The power to tax the exercise of a [right]…is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment.” Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 US 40

“The state cannot diminish the rights of the people.” Hurtado v. California, 110 US 516

Reece v. Scoggins, 506 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1975). ..."The concept of a citizen's right, absent unusual circumstances, to the unobstructed control of his own land, free from arbitrary governmental interference, has long been a fundamental principle in our country's jurisprudence.

'It must be conceded,' said this court, speaking by Mr. Justice MILLER, in Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655-662, 'that there are such rights in every free government beyond the control of the state. A government [110 U.S. 516, 537]   which recognized no such rights,-which held the lives, the liberty, and the property of its citizens subject at all times to the absolute disposition and unlimited control of even the most democratic depository of power,-is after all but a despotism. 
Hurtado v. Calif, 110 US 516, (1884)

78.	Judicial notice will be taken of Article 1, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution.
Texas Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 9
“The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from all unreasonable seizures or searches,…”

79.	The above restriction upon the Texas government keeps the Chief Appraiser of the Montgomery Central Appraisal District from inspecting the interior of plaintiff’s non-income producing private property without the consent of the owner or without a warrant.
Texas Tax Code
Sec. 22.07.  INSPECTION OF PROPERTY.  (a)  The chief appraiser or his authorized representative may enter the premises of a business, trade, or profession and inspect the property to determine the existence and market value of tangible personal property used for the production of income and having a taxable situs in the district.

80.	Even the current Texas legislature understood, even for a business where the owner had a home on the business property that the owner of the business could claim that the home was personal property and was not to be taxed.
Texas Occupation Code
Sec. 1201.2055.  ELECTION BY OWNER.  (a)  In completing an application for the issuance of a statement of ownership and location, an owner of a manufactured home shall indicate whether the owner elects to treat the home as personal property or real property.

81.	Judicial notice will be taken of Article 1, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution.
Texas Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 13
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.”

82.	Judicial notice will be taken of Article 1, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution.
Texas Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 17
“No person’s property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made,…”

83.	Without private property being duly rendered for taxation by the property owner, then any assessment of such non-income producing private property by the Montgomery Central Appraisal District would violate Article 1, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution.
84.	Judicial notice will be taken of Article 1, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution.
Texas Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 19
“No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of law of the land.”

85.	The above specific sections of Article 1 of the Texas Constitution are just some of the enumerated provisions that restrict the actions of the Texas government concerning an individual of the Texas people’s right of property. For elected or appointed officers to make claim to control such private property then such claim must originate from the organic 1876 Texas Constitution or such claims are unconstitutional by the restriction applied by Article 1, Section 29 of the organic 1876 Texas Constitution. Article 1, Section 29 has been the controlling authority that limits the actions of the Texas legislature and such limits have been there from the beginning. 
86.	The establishment of the central appraisal districts in Texas created no authority to diminish the vested rights of an individual of the Texas people. 

MASS APPRAISAL
87.	The Mass Appraisal concept used by the central appraisal districts cannot apply to the non-income producing private property where at or where in an individual of the Texas people is domiciled. 
88.	The Mass Appraisal concept may even tread upon the heels of fraud, if the interior of a piece of taxable property is relevant to the market value of the piece of property that has been rendered for taxation.
89.	The plaintiff is not in receipt of a notice by the Chief Appraiser of the Montgomery Central Appraisal District concerning Section 22.22 of the Texas Tax Code. Apparently the Chief Appraiser is not authorized to require a rendering document from the plaintiff concerning his non-income producing private property.
Sec. 22.22.  METHOD FOR REQUIRING RENDITION OR REPORT.  The chief appraiser may require a rendition statement or property report he is authorized to require by this chapter by delivering written notice that the statement or report is required to the person responsible for filing it.  He shall attach to the notice a copy of the appropriate form.

90.	In the Texas Tax Code at Section 23.01 an individual of the Texas people will find the Appraisal Methods and Procedures. The Texas legislature has recognized the “Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice” as an approved appraisal method and procedure to determine the true market value of property.
91.	Reviewing Tax Code Section 23.01(b) an individual of the Texas people will find:
Sec. 23.01.  APPRAISALS GENERALLY.
(b)  The market value of property shall be determined by the application of generally accepted appraisal methods and techniques.  If the appraisal district determines the appraised value of a property using mass appraisal standards, the mass appraisal standards must comply with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice.

92.	Please notice that the below provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice specifically states that if the interior of a piece of property is relevant to the market value and the inspector cannot gain access to the interior of the property then the inspector must withdraw from the assignment.
UNIFORM STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL APPRAISAL PRACTICE
USPAP 2008–2009
Standards Rule 6-5
In developing a mass appraisal, when necessary for credible assignment results, an appraiser must:
(d) identify the need for and extent of any physical inspection.70

70 See Advisory Opinion 2, Inspection of Subject Property

Advisory Opinion 2, Inspection of the Subject Property advises that if adequate information about the relevant characteristics of the subject property, such as an interior inspection, is not possible by personal inspection or from sources the appraiser believes are reliable, an appraiser must withdraw from the assignment unless the appraiser can:
modify the assignment conditions to expand the scope of work to include gathering the necessary information; or
use an extraordinary assumption about such information, if credible assignment results can still be developed….

93.	The Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice specifically states:
“It is the appraiser’s responsibility to determine the appropriate scope of work, including the degree of inspection necessary to produce credible assignment results given the intended use.”

94.	The above shows the defendants’ responsibility to prove that the interior of plaintiff’s property is not relevant to the market value of plaintiff’s property.
95.	Appraisal of a piece of property without inspection of the interior cannot be considered credible without first hand knowledge of the condition of the interior.
96.	The defendants’ determination of the market value of plaintiff’s non-income producing private property without gaining access to the interior of the property indicates the defendant(s) has committed fraud against the plaintiff for not following the mandates of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice.
97.	The defendants’ unauthorized and fraudulent determination of the true market value of plaintiff’s non-income producing private property without gaining access to the interior of the property indicates the defendant(s) are guilty of negligent hiring for not following the mandates of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and have thereby damaged plaintiff.
98.	The defendants’ unauthorized and fraudulent determination of the true market value of plaintiff’s non-income producing private property without gaining access to the interior of the property indicates the defendant(s) are guilty of breaching of their fiduciary duty toward plaintiff for not following the mandates of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and have thereby damaged plaintiff.
99.	The defendants’ determination of the true market value of plaintiff’s non-income producing private property without gaining access to the interior of the property indicates the defendant(s) are guilty of theft toward plaintiff for not following the mandates of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and have damaged plaintiff.

HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
100.	The organic law of the 1876 Texas Constitution restricts government from interest in the domicile of an individual of the Texas people by use of attachment of property taxes to a home and 200 hundred acres in rural areas of Texas and a home and lot in urban areas of Texas. This restriction was clarified by the Homestead Act of 1839 that continued during the organic 1876 Texas Constitution. (See Law of Jan. 26, 1939, Tex. Gen. Laws [1839-40] 125, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 125 (1898). For a history of the homestead exemption in Texas, see Joseph W. McKnight, Protection of the Family Home from Seizure by Creditors: The Sources and Evolution of a Legal Principle, 87 Sw. Hist. Q. 369 (1983)). 
101.	The Homestead Act in 1839 was based upon gold and silver coin or at least it was by 1876 as the Federal Constitution Article 1, Section 10 specifies.
Sect. 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; Coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

102.	For argument sake, if the funds indicated in the Texas Constitution that are associated with the Homestead exemption were applied as it was in the organic 1876 Texas Constitution; $3,000 in 1876 would equal to one-hundred-fify U.S.A. $20 gold 1 oz. coins. When compared to the inflationary Federal Reserve Notes (FRN) of today, the same $3,000 in gold of 1876 would equate to over $225,000 in today’s Federal Reserve Notes. This comparison still would fall short of a farm house and 200 acres that were exempted by the Homestead Act.
103.	But, the gold coin to FRN comparison above still relates to income producing property and exempting a portion thereof as not to put an individual of the Texas people on the street that failed to produce enough income to make the business productive and could not afford the property tax.
104.	Many statutes and even the Texas Constitution use the term of “residential homestead” as a means of interest by political subdivisions, which have justification in law. But, the differences in the terms “resident” and “domicile” are as different as day and night. A resident alien and non-resident alien should be taxed for the privilege of residing in Texas, but it cannot apply to an individual of the Texas people, born on the soil of Texas, that claims his/her unalienable right of private property, their claim to be domicile on such property and their claim of exemption, even if found to be in commerce, as clarified by the Homestead Act of 1854.
105.	Foreigners’ and aliens’ right of property can be confirmed by going to Texas Property Code 5.004.
Sec. 5.005.  ALIENS.  An alien has the same real and personal property rights as a United States citizen. Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 3481, ch. 576, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1984.

106.	A natural person foreigner/alien cannot be domiciled in Texas. Logic states that a foreigner/alien can only be a resident or non-resident on Texas land that would be considered a privilege and could be taxed. Logic then states that United States citizens, though domiciled in Texas, have the same real and personal property rights as aliens.
107.	The word “exemption” found in Article 8 of the Texas Constitution within the term “homestead exemption” does not mean discount, it means:
a.	The state of being exempt; immunity.
b.	…freedom or release from a liability, obligation, etc.; immunity

108.	Plaintiff’s request for the homestead exemption was do to the belief that plaintiff’s property was subject to taxation and it was not the intent of plaintiff as consent to place plaintiff’s property on the appraisal roll and any such allegation of consent is hereby rescinded by the Release of Powers of Appointment. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit ZD attached)

RENDERING PROPERTY FOR TAXATION
109.	The defendants have admitted that plaintiff has never rendered his non-income producing private property for taxation. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit B & C)
110.	The Texas Administrative Code, RULE §9.3001 indicates that an “appraisal card” is created for every parcel of real estate that is required to be appraised.
111.	The routine or de-facto creation of appraisal cards by the defendants have been done by constructive fraud when owners of non-income producing private property have not voluntarily rendered their property for taxation.
112.	The Texas Administrative Code Sections 9.3031 & 9.3003(b)(3) indicates that rendering forms should be in the possession of the Appraisal Districts whereby giving notice to the appraisers that an appraisal is required for the property is indicated on such rendering form. This form can be submitted by two different sources, the owner of the property or by way of the Tax Assessor/Collector.
113.	The Tax Assessor/Collector has the right to render property that is used in doing business in Texas, but not non-income producing private property.
114.	Judicial notice will be taken of Article 6, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution that was found prior to 1999.
Texas Constitution, Art. 6, Sec. 3
All qualified electors of the State, as herein described, who shall have resided for six months immediately preceding an election, within the limits of any city or corporate town, shall have the right to vote for Mayor and all other elective officers; but in all elections to determine expenditure of money or assumption of debt, only those shall be qualified to vote who pay taxes on property in said city or incorporated town; provided..

115.	The above Article 6, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution indicates that there are those in the past that may have owned property but did not volunteer to pay taxes on such property. 
116.	Those that decided not to render their non-income producing private property for taxation were restricted from voting on issues that “determine expenditure of money or assumption of debt” the same as voters that did not own any property. 
117.	If non-income producing private property taxes was legislated to be mandatory, then such provision would be void under Article 1, Section 29 of the Texas Constitution. 
118.	History shows that before 1979 certain property owners were not required to render their property for taxation. If all non-income producing private property were required by law to be rendered for taxation, then the Tax Assessor/Collector would have just placed the property on the tax roll as he was authorized to do with commercial property. There would not be a need for any incentive for non-income producing private property owners to render their property for taxation to vote. The Tax Assessor/Collector would have rendered it automatically. History shows that rendering of non-income producing private property was not done automatically.
119.	The mandatory requirement for certain property owners to render their property for taxation could be found in prior years of the Texas Constitution in Article 8, Section 5.
Texas Constitution, Art. 8, Sec. 5
“All property of railroad companies, of whatever description, lying or being within the limits of any city or incorporated town within this State, shall bear it proportionate share of municipal taxation and if any such property shall not have been heretofore rendered, the authorities of the city or town within which it lies, shall have the power to require its rendition, and collect the usual municipal tax thereon, as on other property lying within said municipality.”

120.	Of course the above Article 8, Section 5 of the Texas Constitution was repealed under the same HJR 62 in 1999. The voters were led to believe that such changes were meant for: “Eliminating duplicative, executed, obsolete, archaic and ineffective constitutional provisions.”. Reviewing the Bill Analysis of HJR 62, an individual of the Texas people would find that these changes to the Constitution were "non-substantive" changes, but if anyone would look at the following 2000 Texas Constitution, an individual of the Texas people would find a substantive statement:
TEMPORARY TRANSITION PROVISIONS, (i) The repeal of Section 5, Article VIII, does not affect the power of a municipality to impose and collect taxes on the property of railroad companies in accordance with the general authority of municipalities under this constitution to impose and collect those taxes.

121.	Noting that ‘Temporary Transition Provisions’ are only found in the Texas Constitutions for a short period of time, the above provision will be lost to the posterity in time, as other sections have.
122.	Rather than the railroad provision being obsolete or archaic or duplicative or ineffective, obfuscation could be the only reason to remove the requirement of railroads to render property for taxation within a city limit.
123.	The clear picture of voluntary rendering of non-income producing private property has been slowly removed from the eyes of future generations of the Texas people.
124.	The voluntary act of rendering non-income producing private property for taxation as a mandatory qualification to vote in municipal elections has been recognized for many years in Texas.
The constitutional amendment providing that only qualified electors who have duly rendered their taxable property shall be qualified to vote in a bond election was enacted for purpose of inducing owners of property to place it upon tax rolls and become liable for its pro rata share of taxes levied and assessed by municipality and to keep from voting in bond elections those who did not have any property on tax rolls and who did not pay taxes to municipality. Hanson v. Jordan (1947) 145 T. 320, 198 S.W.2nd 262.

Vernon’s…and city laws restricting suffrage in bond elections to persons who have made available for taxation some item of real…property…were not necessary to further state’s interests in limiting the electorate to those who could pay the financial obligation created by the bonds or to maintain a penalty that would encourage voluntary rendering of property for taxation which would enrich the state and city treasuries…  Stone v. Stovall (D.C. 1974) 377 F.Supp. 1016, affirmed 95 S.Ct. 1637, 421 U.S. 289, 44 L. Ed.2nd 172, rehearing denied 95 S.Ct. 2617, 422 U.S. 1029, 45 L.Ed.2nd 686.

The right of suffrage is conferred by the constitution, and is not one of the natural and inalienable rights which are excepted out of the powers of government. State v. Conner, 23 S.W. 1103, 1107

125.	Even 18 years later the Texas Supreme Court again recognized that rendering property was voluntary for most people and that in order to induce them to render their property for taxation there needed to be an incentive.
The situation as stated in these two findings is similar to the facts in Hanson v. Jordan, 145 Tex. 320, 198 S.W.2d 262. Justice Brewster, speaking for the Supreme Court, after stating that the purpose of Art. VI, Sec. 3a, Constitution of the State of Texas, limiting voters at a bond election to voters who had duly rendered their property for taxes, was to induce owners of property to place it upon the tax rolls and become liable for its pro rata share of the taxes levied and assessed by the municipality,… CITY OF ROMA v. GONZALEZ, 397 S.W.2d 943(1965)

126.	The Texas Constitution regulates the system of taxation. The indication is that rendering property for taxation was encouraged so as to enrich the state and city treasuries, and such encouragement would have to be directory upon an individual of the Texas people instead of mandatory.
General or special statutes governing rendition of property for taxes or relating to collection of taxes are directory, and cannot, in absence of fraud or wrongdoing, deprive property owner who has duly rendered property for taxation of right to vote on taxing district’s lending credit or assuming debt. Campbell v. Wright (Civ. App.1936) 95 S.W.2nd 149.

A city ordinance making it a penal offense for property owners to fail or refuse to render their property for taxation in the manner designated by Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. art. 1043 did not make article 1043 a “mandatory statute” rather than a “directory statute,” as respects whether property owners rendering their property for taxation in a manner other than that designated by statute were entitled to vote at city bond election. DuBose v. Ainsworth (Civ.App.1940) 139 S.W.2nd 307, error dismissed.

The time fixed for rendition of property to city for taxation by statute, providing that owner “shall” hand city assessor and collector complete sworn inventory of property within first three months of each calendar or fiscal year, is not mandatory, but directory… MARKOWSKY et al. v. NEWMAN et al., 136 S.W.2d, 808(1940)

A statutory provision, directing, authorizing or commanding an act or thing to be done within certain time, without any negative words restraining the doing thereof afterwards, is usually regarded as directory, not mandatory… MARKOWSKY et al. v. NEWMAN et al., 136 S.W.2d, 808(1940)

127.	The Texas legislature for many years and still today created demands by their Acts that seemed to be for all property owners, but as plaintiff will and has shown, regulation by mandatory means were directed to firm, corporations, companies and foreigners (residents & non-residents) on the land, and not to an individual of the Texas people domiciled on the land.
128.	The type of demand shown below was intended to also fool individuals of the Texas people into believing that the below demand pertained to those that had only non-income producing private property.
Each person, partnership, and corporation owning property within the limits of the corporation shall, between January first and April first of each year, hand to the city assessor and collector a full and complete sworn inventory of the property possessed or controlled by him, her, or them, within said limits on the first day of January of the current year. If the fiscal year of a municipal corporation runs otherwise than the calendar year, such corporation may by ordinance require said inventory to be made as of the first day of the fiscal year, in which case the inventory shall be handed to the city assessor and collector within the first three months of the fiscal year. (As amended Acts 1934, 43rd Leg., 3rd C.S., p. 50, ch.27, Sec. 1.) Pocket Part Vol. 2, Vernon’s Annotated Statutes, art. 1043.

129.	Again case after Texas case showed that statutes, like indicated above, demanding the rendering of property, were merely directory.
  The requirement in statute for rendition of property to city for taxation, providing that owner “shall” hand to city assessor and collector complete sworn inventory of property within first three months of each calendar or fiscal year is not mandatory but is directory only. Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. 1043. DuBOSE et. al. v.  AINSWORTH, 139 S.W. 2d 307,1940

130.	There is a mandatory requirement that a firm, corporation or company property must be rendered for taxation, but even though, it has been ruled that this requirement did not apply to the stockholders of the corporation.

Although closed corporation owned both real and personal property which was rendered for taxation with city, stockholders who did not render their stock or other property for taxation, were not entitled to vote at municipal bond election. Rouw v. Harrington (Civ.App. 1955) 281 S.W.2nd 746, error dismissed

131.	As stated before, corporations like railroads were required to render their property for taxation. ‘Required by law’ is a term used by the Texas legislature and the Texas Supreme Court indicting where the law is mandatory and not merely directory. The below statement by this Texas court uses that term so as to show that rendering property for taxation is required by some and not for others.
So far as the provisions of aforesaid Art. VI, Sec. 3a, and of aforesaid Art. 5.03 requiring qualified electors who own taxable property to have duly rendered same for taxation as a qualification to vote in a bond election, the mere rendition of property for taxation, as so provided for, is all that is required…Article 7161, V.A.T.S., for instance, provides that each person required by law to list property shall make and sign a verified statement of all property which he is required to list for taxation. HOWTH v. CITY OF BEAUMONT, Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 350 (p. 357)

132.	Notice the term “person” above and the intent of the Texas legislature for one hundred years concerning assessment and collection of taxes. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit H)
133.	In 1939 the Texas Legislative Acts continued to address the voluntary and prerequisite of the property owner duly rendering his property for taxation before the owner’s privilege to vote was authorized.
COUNTY-WIDE EQUALIZATION DISTRICTS CREATED IN
COUNTIES OF 2775 TO 2850 .
(4) No tax shall be levied, collected, abrogated, diminished, or increased, and no bond shall be issued hereunder until such action has been authorized by a majority of the votes cast at an election held in the District for such purposes, at which none but property tax-paying qualified voters of such District who have duly rendered their property for taxation shall be entitled to vote.

134.	In 1934 the Texas Supreme Court also recognized the voluntary act and the prerequisite to be authorized to vote.

Sec. 3a.  When an election is held by any county, or any number of counties, or any political sub-division of the State, or any political sub-division of a county, or any defined district now or hereafter to be described and defined within the State and which may or may not include towns, villages or municipal corporations, or any city, town or village, for the purpose of issuing bonds or otherwise lending credit, or expending money or assuming any debt, only qualified elector who own taxable property in the State, county, political sub-division, district, city town or village where such election is held, and who have duly rendered the same for taxation, shall be qualified to vote and all electors shall vote in the election precinct of their residence. CITY OF RICHMOND et al. v. ALLREAD, 71 S.W.2d. 233

135.	Even back in 1936 the Texas Supreme Court mentions the voluntary act of rendering property for taxation, by specifically stating that such language demanding the rendering of property was not mandatory but directory.
General or special statutes governing rendition of property for taxes or relating to collection of taxes are directory, and cannot, in absence of fraud or wrongdoing, deprive property owner who has duly rendered property for taxation of right to vote on taxing districts lending credit or assuming debt. (Const. Art.6, Sec.3a, Adopted, 1932)
  (4) That 23 electors, all resident property taxpayers within the city of Raymondville, each having duly paid his poll tax, each having property on the tax rolls of said city rendered against him for taxes which he is liable for the year in question, and which such property was placed on the tax rolls under the direction, or at least with the approval or acquiescence, or said taxpayers, in accordance with the previous custom, practice, and agreement between the taxpayers and the city assessor, were denied the right and refused the privilege of casting their ballots at such election…p. 151.
  It is our opinion that the true purpose of such constitutional provision under which this election was held is to restrict and limit the lower and authority of non-property owning or non-taxpaying citizens to pile tax burdens and obligations upon those citizens who in fact own and hold property and pay the taxes thereon. p. 152.
  As against the constitutional right of the citizen to vote, all such statutes are directory. p. 153 CAMPBELL, Mayor, et al. v. WRIGHT, Co. Atty., et al., 95 S.W. 2d 149, 150

136.	The below Texas case shows that being liable for the taxes was particular to those that rendered the property for taxation.

We therefore conclude that proposition A-45, known as the Interregional Highway Bonds, only required a majority vote of the duly qualified property tax-paying voters who had duly rendered their property and who voted at the election, and a two-thirds majority was not required. LUCCHESE et. al. v. MAUERMANN, 195 S.W.2d 422, 1946

137.	Even in 1955, there is a court case that showed that even if people owned a corporation and rendered its property for taxation, the people must also render their stock in the company, before they had the privilege to vote.
Appellant’s first contention is that the court erred in not holding the election to be null and void because some 300 or 400 persons, who were otherwise qualified to vote in the election, were prevented from rendering their personal property for taxes after April 30, 1954, and thus prevented from qualifying to vote in this election…The trial court found as a fact that about one week before the election…Consuelo Guzman desired to render a wrist watch…but went away without seeing the tax assessor and collector. [p. 747]
It was contended that the reason the other three or four hundred person, who owned personal property, had not rendered their property for taxes was because there was talk, generally over the city, that the city officials would not accept any renditions of personal property for the year 1954 after April 30th. 
Thus it is seen that a voter who has not duly rendered his property for taxation is disqualified absolutely from voting in a bond election. Neither the Constitution nor the statute makes any exception to this rule, the disqualification is absolute, therefore, it matters not what excuse a voter may have for failing to render his property for taxation, if he has not done so he is disqualified from voting in a bond election. [p.748]
[5] Appellants next complain because H. Rouw and Erma Beck, who owned stock in a corporation known as the H. Rouw Company, and which corporation in turn did own both real and personal property rendered for taxation with the City of Edinburg, were not permitted to vote. The corporation was shown to be a closed corporation and all the stock was owned by these two persons. The parties did not render their stock for taxation. What H. Rouw and Erma Beck owned was only stock in the corporation. The property which they owned had not been rendered for taxation. [p. 749] H. ROUW et al., v. HARRINGTON, 281 S.W.2d 746

138.	Neither history nor law supports the presumptive argument that taxing units established by school districts can mandate property owners (or private property owners) to render their property for taxation. To wit:

SCHOOL DISTRICTS—TAXING POWER
CHAPTER 74—REGULAR SESSION 1957
Section 3.   The provisions of this Act shall be cumulative of other laws; provided, however, that this Act shall not apply to any school district until and unless a maintenance tax hereunder is adopted by majority vote of the resident, qualified, property tax-paying voters of the district who own taxable property therein and which has been duly rendered for taxation

SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION, REPAIR AND RENOVATION—TAX ASSESSMENT
CHAPTER 54—REGULAR SESSION 1959
Sec. 2.  The levy, allocation and expenditure of such portion of the maintenance tax as herein provided, may be made after such action has been approved by a majority of the resident, qualified property tax paying voters, who own taxable property within the district which has been duly rendered for taxation…

JACKSON COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT
CHAPTER 22—3RD CALLED SESSION 1959
Sec. 1 (b)   ...No bonds wholly or partially supported by taxes, except refunding bonds, shall be issued unless and until they have been authorized at an election called by the Board of Directors at which a majority of the duly qualified resident electors of said District who own taxable property within said District and who have duly rendered the same for taxation, voting at said election, have voted in favor thereof…

139.	In 1960, the court showed in MARTIN v. RICHTER, 342 S.W.2d 1, that there were at least three conditions regarding the ability for people to vote in bond elections.
Urban Renewal Law authorizes agency to issue bonds from time to time in its discretion without being subject to other provisions of law relating to authorization, issuance, or sale of bonds, and hence election involving question as to whether city should adopt Urban Renewal Law is an election involving expenditure of monies so that provision of law restricting privilege of suffrage to those qualified voters owning taxable property within the city and who have duly rendered the same for taxation, does not violate constitutional provisions requiring that in all elections to determine expenditure of money assumption of debt, only those who pay taxes on property in city shall be qualified to vote. Vernon’s Ann. St. Const. art.5. Sec.3; art. 6, Secs. 2,3,3a; Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. art. 1269l-3, Secs. 5,9. [p.1&2] 

The disqualified voters were divided into three general classifications: (1) those who were not “legally qualified to vote in such election for the reason that they had not duly rendered taxable property situated within the city for taxation”, (2) those who did not possess “a current poll tax receipt as required by law nor had they procured a certificate of exemption, in order to qualify them to cast a vote in such election”, and (3) those who “although they owned taxable property within the City of Laredo, such property was not rendered by them for taxation until after the period of time affixed by law for such rendition had expired in contravention of Article 5.03, Texas Election Code (as amended) [V.A.T.S.].” [p. 2,3]

…The Attorney General had refused to approve the bonds, assigning as a reason for his refusal that the transcript of the proceedings showed that the City Commission by its order for the election submitted the question as to the issuance of the bonds to the resident qualified voters of the city, when, under the Constitution, such question should have been submitted to and determined by only qualified electors who owned taxable property in the city and who had rendered the same for taxation. [p. 6] MARTIN v. RICHTER, 342 S.W.2d 1

140.	In 1973 it was still recognized that an individual of the Texas people had to consent to render his/her property for taxation to acquire the privilege to vote, but the legislative action has not been addressed until now, that rendering had to be done each and every year and was not done automatically. 
PALO DURO RIVER AUTHORITY
CHAPTER 438—REGULAR SESSION 1973
Sec. 23.  (a) No bonds payable wholly or partially from ad valorem taxes (except refunding bonds) shall be issued unless authorized by an election at which only the qualified voters who reside in the Authority and who own taxable property therein and who have duly rendered their property for taxation and unless a majority of the votes cast in each city contained in the Authority is in favor of the issuance of the bonds.

SABINE PASS PORT AUTHORITY
CHAPTER 379—REGULAR SESSION 1973
Sec. 82.  …The assessor and collector shall assess and collect taxes on all taxable property in the authority, and the property shall be governed by the law relating to state and county taxes.
Sec. 83. (b)  On or before April 1 of each year, the assessor and collector shall furnish each taxpayer and owner of property in the authority a blank form on which to render his property for taxation. The form may be delivered personally or may be delivered by mail addressed to the owner at his last known address.

141.	Prior to 1973 the Texas Legislature in 1961 gives question as to the meaning of any bond election throughout Texas.  To wit:

BELL COUNTY WATER CONTROL AND IMPROVEMENT 
DISTRICT NO. 6
CHAPTER 300—REGULAR SESSION 1961
Sec. 4.  … “The provisions of Article 7880—77b, Vernon’s Civil Statutes, or any other General Law pertaining to the calling of a hearing for the determination of the dissolution of a district where a bond election has failed shall be inapplicable to this District, and this District shall continue to exist and have full powers to function and operate regardless of the outcome of any bond election.”

142.	Any action by the defendants to create a document that would make others believe that the plaintiff had rendered his property for taxation, when in fact and truth this act never occurred, would be an act of forgery, which is a violation of the Texas Penal Code §32.21.
"We therefore conclude that an instrument is passed within the meaning of the forgery statute if it is delivered or circulated." 
Parker v. State, 985 S.W.2d 460, 464 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999).

143.	The defendants have not produced a copy of a rendering document signed by the plaintiff or documentation showing that plaintiff’s property was held or used for the production of income.
144.	In the absence of rendering documents signed by the plaintiff, as the rendering of plaintiff’s property was directory and not mandatory, the defendants jointly committed fraud upon the plaintiff, to his perpetual misery, grief and expense.

ALL PROPERTY
145.	Throughout the Texas Constitution and Texas statues we find the term “all property” and even one section indicating “all real property”, but such terms do not mean “all”. Easily we can confirm that the term “all” represents different classes of property, but not all property. This can be verified by checking different central appraisal districts to find that certain property is missing from the appraisal rolls. Of course, investigation of certain properties missing from the appraisal rolls would show that such property was exempted by statute or “exempt as required or permitted by this Constitution”, or rather just omitted by mysterious circumstances.
146.	The confirmation that “all” is not “all” can be found by searching the Acts of the Texas legislature for the last hundred years. If you find an Act that is addressing property taxes you find the words “qualified electors who have duly rendered property for taxation” which can be found in the Revised Civil Statutes of 1925. Of course later, the wording was simplified by using “property which has been rendered for taxation” which some may conclude that the Act created a means for agencies to render the property for the people, but for those who seek will know that Article 1, Section 29 of the Texas Constitution forbids mandatory rendering of non-income producing private property without the consent of an individual of the Texas people who own the property.
147.	But, when you look into 1945 of the 49th Regular Session of the Texas legislature you find another meaning of “all property” to be just government-owned property.
SCHOOL DISTRICTS—TAXATION OF PROPERTY
CHAPTER 298
Section 1.  That Subsection 4 of Article 7150 of the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925 be and the same is hereby amended so as to hereafter read as follows.
Subsection 4.  All property, whether real or personal, belonging exclusively to this State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the United States, except that in each county in this State, where the State of Texas has or may acquire and own land for the purpose of establishing thereon State farms and employing thereon convict labor on State account, the penitentiary board or board of penitentiary commissioners, or other officers of the penitentiary having the management of the same, shall render said land for taxes to the assessor of said county and to the tax assessor of each independent school district in which said property, or any part thereof, is located; and the taxes on same shall be assessed and collected in the manner required by law for the assessment and collection of other taxes;…including all current taxes and all delinquent taxes, shall be paid annually out of the General Revenue Fund of the State. In arriving at the amount to be paid in taxes to the counties the value of the land only shall be considered and not the value of the buildings and other improvements owned by the State and situated on said land.
 
TAXABLE PROPERTY
148.	In 1876 the term “taxable property” was recognized, but by 1940 the term started showing up in the Texas Constitution and in other Acts of the Texas legislature. Someone in the Texas legislature came to the conclusion that there were two types of property, that being “taxable property” and “non-taxable property”. 
149.	If “all” property in Texas were taxable, then there would be no relevance to create the term “taxable property” but only “exempt property”.  
150.	In all Texas legislative Acts where the subject matter is property taxes, the labeling of a piece of property to a type of “property” could only be authorized against “taxable property”. 
151.	This reasonable conclusion is verified throughout history showing that non-income producing private property is entered into the category of “taxable property” only by the prerequisite of the owner duly rendering such property for taxation.
152.	In the Acts of the Texas Legislature of 1947 Regular Session, Chapter 85 we find that even if an individual of the Texas people has property that could be taxable, it is not mandatory that such property be rendered for taxation. 
COUNTY-WIDE SCHOOL MAINTENANCE TAX
Sec. 2. …and only qualified electors who own taxable property in such county and who have duly rendered the same for taxation shall be qualified to vote at said election, and all electors shall vote in the election precincts of their residence…

THE STATE OF TEXAS IS RESPONSIBLE TO FUND SCHOOLS
WITHOUT AD VALOREM TAXES
153.	As we see by the declaration above (#141) about District 6, there are provisions provided where, as with other firms, corporations and companies, public subdivisions are too big to fail. An example of this type of provision to support this is found in Article 7, Section 2 & 5 of the Texas Constitution.  
Texas Constitution, ARTICLE 7
Sec. 2.  PERPETUAL SCHOOL FUND.  All funds, lands and other property heretofore set apart and appropriated for the support of public schools; all the alternate sections of land reserved by the State out of grants heretofore made or that may hereafter be made to railroads or other corporations of any nature whatsoever; one half of the public domain of the State; and all sums of money that may come to the State from the sale of any portion of the same, shall constitute a perpetual public school fund.

Sec. 5.  PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND; AVAILABLE SCHOOL FUND; USE OF FUNDS; DISTRIBUTION OF AVAILABLE SCHOOL FUND.
(d) The legislature by law may provide for using the permanent school fund to guarantee bonds issued by school districts or by the state for the purpose of making loans to or purchasing the bonds of school districts for the purpose of acquisition, construction, or improvement of instructional facilities including all furnishings thereto. If any payment is required to be made by the permanent school fund as a result of its guarantee of bonds issued by the state, an amount equal to this payment shall be immediately paid by the state from the treasury to the permanent school fund. An amount owed by the state to the permanent school fund under this section shall be a general obligation of the state until paid.

154.	The above provisions bring into question whether or not The State of Texas is actually partners with their creation of the central appraisal districts. All property taxes are raised in each county of Texas through the central appraisal districts appraisal review boards as directed & trained by the State of Texas Comptroller.
155.	For every dollar extracted by the central appraisal districts from the property owners for the schools in the district is one less dollar less that the State of Texas must extract from the funds established to support the schools.
156.	The Texas Supreme Court has ruled many times that the ad valorem tax system is unconstitutional, but the system still continually rob the property owners.

AD VALOREM
157.	Researching the amendments to the Texas Constitution, plaintiff found that the term “ad valorem” could not be located before 1933, when it appeared in Article 8, Section 1-a of the Texas Constitution because of House Bill 32. It specifically showed that the property tax was a donation and not mandatory.
Sec. 1-a.  NO STATE AD VALOREM TAX LEVY; COUNTY LEVY FOR ROADS AND FLOOD CONTROL; TAX DONATIONS.  From and after January 1, 1951, no State ad valorem tax shall be levied upon any property within this State for general revenue purposes.  From and after January 1, 1951, the several counties of the State are authorized to levy ad valorem taxes upon all property within their respective boundaries for county purposes, except the first Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000) value of residential homesteads of married or unmarried adults, male or female; including those living alone, not to exceed thirty cents (30›) on each One Hundred Dollars ($100)valuation, in addition to all other ad valorem taxes authorized by the Constitution of this State, provided the revenue derived there from shall be used for construction and maintenance of Farm to Market Roads or for Flood Control, except as herein otherwise provided. 
     Provided that in those counties or political subdivisions or areas of the State from which tax donations have heretofore been granted, the State Automatic Tax Board shall continue to levy the full amount of the State ad valorem tax for the duration of such donation, or until all legal obligations heretofore authorized by the law granting such donation or donations shall have been fully discharged, whichever shall first occur; provided that if such donation to any such county or political subdivision is for less than the full amount of State ad valorem taxes so levied, the portion of such taxes remaining over and above such donation shall be retained by said county or subdivision.  (Added Nov. 8, 1932; amended Aug. 26, 1933, Nov. 2, 1948, and Nov. 6, 1973.)

158.	In 1967 the Texas Legislature through House Bill 60 and Senate Bill 32 proposed a State ‘ad valorem’ tax that would be submitted to qualified electors in the following year during the election in November. This proposed amendment would have an expiration date removing the State ‘ad valorem’ tax after 1978. Must be a coincidence that the Texas legislature created the Tax Code and central appraisal districts in 1979.
Texas Constitution
ARTICLE 8
Sec. 1‑e.  ABOLITION OF AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAXES.  No State ad valorem taxes shall be levied upon any property within this State.  (Added Nov. 5, 1968; amended Nov. 2, 1982, and Nov. 6, 2001.)

159.	The defendants indirectly levy ad valorem taxes for The State of Texas so as to reduce the amount of funds issued by the State of Texas to political subdivisions through their perpetual public school fund and the permanent school fund found in Article 7, Sections 2 & 5 of the Texas Constitution, violating Article 8, Section 1-e of the Texas Constitution.

EQUAL & UNIFORM TAXATION
160.	The practiced policy and custom used by the defendants and their employees fail to meet the constitutional provision of mandating equal and uniform taxation even from duly rendered property for taxation, violating Article 8, Section 1(a) of the Texas Constitution.
161.	Equal and uniform taxes must be based upon law and not opinion.
162.	The Texas Constitution recognizes in Article 8, Section 1(d) that property not held or used for the production of income cannot be taxed as it is barred by Article 1, Section 29 of the Texas Constitution. The term “income” has not been defined, but could not mean compensation from self labor. The provision below indicates that the property is exempt and not just discounted.

Texas Constitution ARTICLE 8
Sec. 1.  EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY; TAX IN PROPORTION TO VALUE; INCOME TAX; EXEMPTION OF CERTAIN TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY FROM AD VALOREM TAXATION.  
(a) Taxation shall be equal and uniform.
(d) The Legislature by general law shall exempt from ad valorem taxation household goods not held or used for the production of income and personal effects not held or used for the production of income…

163.	The above Article 8. Section 1 makes the declaration that “taxation shall be equal and uniform”. Mass Appraisal concept is unconstitutional as the principal is not equal and uniform. If it were equal and uniform, then any individual of the Texas people would come to the same conclusion as to the matter of tax of the same commercial property and would not be assessed by merely opinion. Taxation is not based upon ‘Lets Make a Deal’, but should be equal and uniform.
164.	Appraisals cannot be considered equal and uniform by expressing a guess what lies within the interior of a private home and shows that every appraisal of non-income producing private property, by failing to gain access to the property, violated Article 8, Section 20 and Article 9, Section 12 of the Texas Constitution even if rendered for taxation.
Texas Constitution Article 8, Section 20
“No property of any kind in this State shall ever be assessed for ad valorem taxes at a greater value than its fair cash market value nor shall any Board of Equalization of any governmental or political subdivision or taxing district within this State fix the value of any property for tax purposes at more than its fair cash market value;…”

Texas Constitution Article 9, Section 20(d)
“…The taxable property shall be assessed on a valuation not to exceed the market value and shall be equal and uniform throughout the Authority as is otherwise provided by the Constitution.”

165.	The central appraisal districts must be willing to purchase a piece of property or have a willing buyer of a piece of property that they have appraised for the appraisal to be considered equal and uniform.
166.	Without the central appraisal district offering to buy or providing a willing buyer, the appraisal is just an opinion that is not equal and uniform.
167.	Plaintiff accepted the Montgomery Central Appraisal Districts offer of appraisal, but the ARB and MCAD refused to close the deal or find another willing buyer of plaintiff’s property which nullified the appraisal to be equal and uniform. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit B & C)
168.	An appraisal, not requested by an individual of the Texas people, is just an opinoin and has no bases in fact without a willing seller and a willing buyer.
169.	The only fact that the central appraisal districts can rely upon is what the current owner of the property paid for the property and the conditions of the sale.
170.	To increase or decrease an appraisal without first gaining access to the interior of the property and second finding a willing buyer of the property then the appraisal has no bases of being credible, contains the elements of fraud and cannot be considered equal and uniform by the Texas Constitution.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAXING SYSTEM
171.	In 1989, in Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989), the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the state's public school finance system, with its heavy dependence on local property taxes, violated Article 7, Section 1 provision of the Texas Constitution. 
"An unconstitutional act is not law. It confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protections, it creates no office. It is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it has never does not exist, can have no validity whatever in law." Norton v. Shelby County,  118 USR 425

172.	The Texas Supreme Court has ruled, as recently as November 22, 2005, where they consolidated NEELEY v. WEST ORANGE-COVE CONSOLIDATED, NO. 04-1144; ALVARADO v. NEELEY, NO. 05-0145; and EDGEWOOD v. NEELEY, where they stated:
“We now hold, as did the district court, that local ad valorem taxes have become a state property tax in violation of article VIII, section 1-e, as we warned ten years ago they inevitably would, absent a change in course, which has not happened.”
NEELEY v. WEST ORANGE-COVE CONSOLIDATED, NO. 04-1144; ALVARADO v. NEELEY, NO. 05-0145; and EDGEWOOD v. NEELEY

173.	The Texas Legislature has yet to correct the unconstitutionality provision to support the state’s public school finance system.

SUMMARY
174.	Plaintiff does not strive for indictment of the forgery committed by the defendants at this time, insofar as this practice, policy and custom of taxing non-rendered, non-taxable property is state wide and common place throughout Texas by the central appraisal districts. 
175.	Plaintiff does not believe that criminal intent was behind the forgery, other than a case of negligent hiring. Proper training would have eliminated or at least reduced the amount of unintentional forgery that is throughout Texas by the central appraisal districts, or perhaps this policy evolved in favor of just raising more revenue.
176.	Defendants owe the plaintiff a legal duty, being public servants, to hire, supervise, train, or retain competent employees, especially if they are paid by tax-payer funds.
177.	The defendants knew or should have known that plaintiff had not rendered his property for taxation and acted accordingly.
178.	The defendants knew or should have known that plaintiff’s property was not held or used for the production of income and acted accordingly.
179.	If plaintiff had rendered his property for taxation, plaintiff would have a reasonable expectation to have the same variance given to the previous owner of the same property, in the same condition.
180.	It is reasonable to presume that negligent hiring and culpable ignorance by the defendants accounts for selective enforcement standards which vary from owner to owner of the same property for no reasonable purpose other than enriching the defendants at plaintiff's expense.
181.	Negligent hiring by the defendants and culpable ignorance on their part, demonstrates that their appraisals are not based on the Tax Code, law or the intent of the Texas legislature, nor being equal and uniform, but are based upon policy, practice, custom and the opinion of individuals, including but not limited to the defendants.
182.	Negligent hiring by the defendants shows that instead of keeping the same appraisal for a piece of property where no property was sold during the previous year, which was comparable to the property in question, the defendants go back two and three years to find properties sold, well-knowing that property values had gone down for that appraisal year.
183.	Negligent hiring by the defendants shows that no notice was given on their web site to indicate that it was the policy and custom of the defendants to consider damaged property repaired by the simple act of changing owners.
"Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified." 
Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233. See Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274 ; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 ; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385.

184.	Negligent hiring by the defendants shows that no investigation or interview with previous owners of damaged property to confirm the assumption that property was repaired before the sale to plaintiff.
185.	The defendants had documents in their possession, filed by the previous owners of plaintiff’s property, showing the condition of plaintiff’s property; but failed to review or submit such documents before any ARB hearing in presence of plaintiff.
186.	The defendants’ prove by their acts and omissions detailed above, that they wantonly, maliciously, and knowingly breached their duty to hire, supervise, train, or retain competent employees whereby plaintiff claims negligent hiring by the defendants.
187.	The defendants’ breach of their fiduciary duty through negligence in training their employees, including the Chief Appraiser which proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.
188.	Defendants have the duty of full disclosure; that is, a duty not to conceal matters that might influence a fiduciary’s actions to the principal’s prejudice unless they claim not to be public servants.
189.	The defendants wantonly, maliciously, and in disregard of law, knowingly failed to notice plaintiff that his purchased piece of damaged private property in Montgomery County would be considered repaired and in disregard of law.
190.	Such notice was not done at the Montgomery County courthouse, or otherwise.
191.	Such notice was not done in a newspaper in the Montgomery County area, or otherwise.
192.	Such notice was not done in the Montgomery County Clerk’s Office, or otherwise.
193.	Such notice was not done on defendants’ web site: http://www.mcad-tx.org, or otherwise.
194.	In disregard of law and by failing to notice plaintiff, the defendants caused severe and irreparable harm to plaintiff and his family and caused an undue and costly burden upon the plaintiff.
It is equally fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard "must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 .

195.	Plaintiff’s non-income producing private property has not been shown to be commercial property, and therefore not subject to notice of a change in appraised value.
196.	By forging documents to show plaintiff had rendered his property for taxation or that his property was subject to taxation, the defendants wantonly, maliciously, and knowingly appropriated the non-income producing private property by taking it without the plaintiff’s effective consent.

Texas Gov. Code
CHAPTER 2007. GOVERNMENTAL ACTION AFFECTING PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER B. ACTION TO DETERMINE TAKING
Sec. 2007.021. Suit Against Political Subdivision
(a) A private real property owner may bring suit under this subchapter to determine whether the governmental action of a political subdivision results in a taking under this chapter.  A suit under this subchapter must be filed in a district court in the county in which the private real property owner's affected property is located.

197.	The defendants created documents by forgery to appear that plaintiff had either rendered his private non-income producing property for taxation or that his property was subject to taxation each year and then supplied such documents to the Montgomery Tax Assessor/Collector creating an assumed obligation upon the plaintiff causing a theft of funds and a lack of benefit toward plaintiff by such action.
198.	The plaintiff sustained severe and irreparable damages as a result of the fraud and theft, by defendants that would shock the conscience.
199.	Plaintiff claims theft of property by the defendants.
Property is considered to be the highest right which a man can have to anything, real or personal, being a complex bundle of rights, duties, powers, and immunities, comprising a vast variety of rights, with certain rights such as the right of use, the right of enjoyment, and the right of disposal considered to be the constituent elements or essential attributes of property.  It is generally recognized that property includes the right of acquisition, the right of dominion, the right of possession, the right of use and enjoyment, the right of exclusion, and the right of disposition.  There are frequent statements to the effect that these rights may be exercised to the exclusion of all others, freely, and without restriction, and without control or diminution save only by the laws of the land, and that anything which destroys one or more of the elements of property to that extent destroys the property itself, although title and possession remain undisturbed.
CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, 73 CJS Property §1

200.	By the defendants’ acts and omissions, the defendants have demonstrated persuasively, their guilt of negligent hiring, breach of fiduciary duty, theft and fraud against the rights, property, privileges and immunities of the plaintiff.
201.	The defendants had no authority or otherwise to render plaintiff’s property for taxation or pretend that plaintiff’s property was subject to taxation without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff.
202.	Plaintiff expected to pay the same tax donations that the previous owners of plaintiff’s property had paid during the three previous years of their tenancy, until plaintiff discovered that taxes on his non-income producing private property are not required much less mandatory until and unless plaintiff voluntarily renders it taxable himself.
203.	In total disregard of law, including but not limited to the violation of the Texas Constitution, and without reason or justification, the defendants used custom and policy in their attempt to extort over 400% more donations from plaintiff than were levied upon the previous owners for the same damaged property in the same condition.
204.	The defendants knew or should have known that, without plaintiff duly rendering his private non-income producing property for taxation, all funds collected by threat of a lien, would be extorted in an unconstitutional manner as per the Texas Supreme Court.
205.	Pursuant to Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, plaintiff believes that he has provided more than a "scintilla of evidence" to persuasively prove all elements of each cause of action submitted against the defendants.
We have repeatedly held that more than a scintilla of evidence exists if the evidence "rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions." 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997)

206.	When plaintiff was exhausting his administrative remedies with the Montgomery County Commissioners Court, the County Judge informed plaintiff that the Montgomery County Commissioners Court had no authority to regulate the actions of the defendants.
Texas Constitution
Art 5, Section 18 (b) : 
(b) Each county shall, in the manner provided for justice of the peace and constable precincts, be divided into four commissioners precincts in each of which there shall be elected by the qualified voters thereof one County Commissioner, who shall hold his office for four years and until his successor shall be elected and qualified.  The County Commissioners so chosen, with the County Judge as presiding officer, shall compose the County Commissioners Court, which shall exercise such powers and jurisdiction over all county business, as is conferred by this Constitution and the laws of the State, or as may be hereafter prescribed.

207.	The definition of personal liberty is:
"Personal liberty, or the Right to enjoyment of life and liberty, is one of the fundamental or natural Rights, which has been protected by its inclusion as a guarantee in the various constitutions, which is not derived from, or dependent on, the U.S. Constitution, which may not be submitted to a vote and may not depend on the outcome of an election. It is one of the most sacred and valuable Rights, as sacred as the Right to private property ... and is regarded as inalienable." 
16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sect.202, p.987

208.	Texas Bill of Rights are specific as to the restrictions placed upon the Legislative, Executive, Judicial and even the Administrative branches of the Texas government. Article 1, Section 29 of the organic 1876 Texas Constitution is specifically restrictive as it forbids the legislature from creating a law that would abridge the rights so enumerated. This particular section also restricts the legislature from using Bills or House Joint Resolutions to change the Texas Constitution by using the vote of the people to create a ‘get around an Article 1’ provision that could impersonate the authority to regulate people’s rights. Such actions are unconstitutional.
"An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed."
Norton v. Shelby County,  118 USR 425

209.	Even if the majority of the people voted to remove a vested right, Article 1, Section 29 of the Texas Constitution, restricts any authority by the Texas Legislature to submit such provisions to the people for their consideration.
210.	The Montgomery Central Appraisal District is a headless rogue entity that does not contain the means or the incentive to give remedy to plaintiff and must be ordered by the Texas judicial system to give remedy by the only authority it recognizes. 
211.	By all evidence submitted, the central appraisal districts in Texas are headless rogue entities that have no oversight by any elected official.
212.	Only the power invested in a Texas District Court Judge by the Texas Legislature and the Texas Constitution can possibly rein in the unlawful acts of the defendants.
213.	Plaintiff submits this memorandum of law in support of plaintiff’s original petition.

Respectfully submitted,

_________________________________
Bobie Kenneth Townsend
							1504 Memorial Ln.
							Conroe, Texas
							936-756-2151 – Home
							713-410-4050

Certificate of Service

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law In Support of Plaintiff’s Original Petition was served on defendants’ attorney by using the United States Postal Service, via certified mail, return receipt requested, post paid this 7th day of May, 2012.

Robert Mott
SBN: 14596450
Joseph T. Longoria
SBN: 12544860
Perdue, Brandon, Fielder, Collins & Mott, L.L.P.
1235 North Loop West, Suit 600
Houston, Texas 77008
(713) 862-1860
(713) 869-0030 Fax

_________________________________
Bobie Kenneth Townsend
							1504 Memorial Ln.
							Conroe, Texas
							936-756-2151 – Home
							713-410-4050